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THE IMPORTANCE OP ECONOMIC POLICY IN DEVELOPMENT:
CONTRASTS BETWEEN KOREA AND TURKEY
Anne 0. Krueger*
In the early years of thinking about development, the majority of
policy makers and development economists were skeptical —— to put it mildly ——
of the importance of the traditional "neoclassical" analysis and policy
prescriptions. In no field was this more true than international trade, where
doubts were expressed about the rate at which developing countries could
expand their exports (elasticity pessimism), the probable future of terms of
trade for primary commodities, and the ability of developing countries to
experience satisfactory industrial growth in the absence of high walls of
protection surrounding their infant industries.
Three phenomena proved that much of that skepticism was ill—
founded. First, empirical evidence failed to support either elasticity
pessimism with regard to the terms of trade. Second, analytical developments
revealed difficulties with a protectionist strategy even beyond those that had
earlier been pointed out by advocates of free trade. Third, experience in
developing countries that adopted protectionist strategies proved less
satisfactory than had been anticipated, while those developing countries that
adopted more outer—oriented trade strategies had performance that usually
exceeded expectations.
* I am indebted to Bela Balassa, Vittorio Corbo, Kemal Dervis, Kwang Suh Kim,
Chong Nam, Julio Nogues, Sarath Rajapatirana, and Rusdu Saracoglu for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Of the analytical developments that were important, development of
the concept of effective protection was certainly key. In demonstrating that
the same nominal tariff rate might imply very different rates of protection to
value added for producers of different specific items, the concept served to
underscore the infeasibility of a "rational" protective structure: the
only
uniform effective tariff was a uniform nominal tariff, which, in turn, implied
a zero rate of protection or uniform nominal tariffs and export subsidies once
it was recognized that tariffs did not affect the prices of exportables.
Max Corden's seminal work on effective protection was a key element
in the gradual shift in thinking about trade policy in relation to
development. His emphasis in both his teaching and research on the importance
of trade policy, and his contributions to trade policy discussions, helped
focus attention on the importance of these issues, and influenced both his
colleagues and a generation of students. His careful, straightforward,
analytical approach did much to clarify the issues and to speed the time when
policies might shift.
Although good theory can inform policy decisions, it cannot by itself
yield guidance as to the quantitative importance of those decisions.
Moreover, most policies are implemented in an environment where myriad other
changes are occurring simultaneously, and it is often difficult for the
analyst, based on the experience of a single country, to infer the
quantitative importance of a particular change. Hence, a variety of other
methods of attempting to assess the quantitative importance of policy shifts
are needed, none of which in and of themselves can prove conclusive but which,
through the weight of cumulative evidence, can permit firmer judgments to
form.
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One such method is comparison of countries with different policy
regimes. An interesting one is that of Turkey and Korea, the subject of this
essay. Both started out, in the 1950s, with a legacy of highly restrictive
trade policies and severe macroeconomic imbalances. Turkey maintained a
broadly restrictionist trade strategy until 1980, whereas Korea shifted in the
early l960s. While all countries have unique circumstances that make any
comparison subject to numerous qualifications, the similarities and
differences between these two countries make an interesting case study that
demonstrate the importance of trade policy, and therefore of Corden's
contributions, in the development process. An essay on the contrasts between
Turkish and Korean experience therefore seems an appropriate tribute to him.
Out of this contrast, the lesson that "policies matter" emerges
clearly. Any observer of developing countries in the 1950s would have
concluded .that, in almost all regards, Turkey had the more favorable
development prospects. The Korean reforms of the early l960s, however, led to
a fundamental transformation of the economy. Although Turkey also undertook
some necessary changes in policy in the late l950s, the reforms centered only
on immediate correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and did not encompass any
overhaul of the incentive structure.
An initial section provides background information on the economic
structures and other circumstances of the two countries in the early 1950s. A
second section then traces the evolution of economic policy over the 1960—1985
period in the two countries. A final section then contrasts the economic
performance of the two countries.
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1. Initial Similarities and Differences
1.1 Pre—1953 Heritage
Comparison of any two countries, especially with widely disparate
cultural geopolitical backgrounds, is always hazardous. And, in some
fundamental regards, the Turkish and Korean backgrounds are very different.
Although Turks were always a distinct group, Turkey was the seat of
the Ottoman Empire until the first World War, and emerged thereafter as an
independent Turkish nation under the leadership of Ataturk) Disassociation
from the Ottoman rule brought with it the declaration that Turkey was a
secular state, the introduction of Latin alphabet, and a conscious effort to
"modernize" and adopt political, legal, and economic systems much more akin to
those of Europe than to those associated with the Ottoman legacy.
Nonetheless, the vast majority of Turks are Muslim and cultural ties to the
Middle East remain. One might even venture the generalization that Turkey was
and is caught between Europe and the Middle East and confronts a challenge to
find her own unique identity between these two large and dissimilar regions.
In the 1920s and 1930s, many of the institutions that would be
important in the postwar years were established. For present purposes,
concern must be limited to noting those developments that significantly
affected growth in the post—1950 period. After an initial period of
relatively laissez—faire policies in the 1920s and very low overall growth,
the government rejected the philosophy and shifted to a policy of "Etatism" in
the 1930s. Although "Etatism" as enunciated contained a large number of
elements with important implications for policy (such as the view that there
were no distinct economic interests and hence there was no recognition of any
role or rights for particular groups such as unions or industrialists), the
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chief and lasting legacy was the establishment of a number of State Economic
Enterprises (SEEs) which produced and marketed a variety of agricultural,
mineral and manufactured comodities. Many of these SEEs produced
manufactured goods that had previously been imported. High tariffs were
established to protect the new enterprises. By the end of the 1940s, it is
estimated that more than half of Turkish industrial production originated in
SEEs. They produced, and continue to produce, a variety of import—substitute
commodities, ranging from textile, clothing, and footwear to petroleum
products, paper, fertilizer, and steel. In most activities, there is also
private production.
The 1920s and 1930s also witnessed rapid expansion of Turkish
schools, and an increase of educational attainments in Turkey. Even so, in
1950, about half of the male population over 14 years of age was illiterate.
Korea, by contrast, had a long history as a distinct nation prior to
the 20th century, but was occupied as a Japanese colony in 1910. Korea is
situated between the two geographic giants of East Asia — China and Japan —
just as Turkey is situated between Europe and the Middle East. Although there
is a Confucian tradition in common with her Asian neighbors, Koreans have been
a distinct ethnic group and nation for many centuries. They have tended to be
somewhat inward—looking throughout their history, except when invaded or
occupied by one of the two large Asian powers.
During the 1920s and l930s, considerable manufacturing activity
developed in Korea under Japanese occupation, although much of it was in the
north and was owned by Japanese who also constituted a very high fraction
(probably 80 percent) of the technical manpower. Under the Japanese, little
emphasis was placed on educating Korean children, and such education as did
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occur was provided in the Japanese language; use of Korean and teaching of
Korean language and culture were forbidden.
During the Second World War, Turkey was not an active combatant, but
nonetheless was largely Cut off from internationaL markets. Inflation rose
sharply, reaching peak rates of 92 and 74 percent in 1942 and 1943
respectively (Hale, 1981, p. 69). Economic activity was stagnant due in large
part to the cutoff from international trade. As of 1946, Turkey was the
poorest country in Europe, with the lowest per capita income and the highest
rate of inflation. It is estimated that real GNP in Turkey grew at an average
annual rate of about 2 percent over the decade 1938 to 1948.
Whereas the Second World War was a period, of very slow growth for
Turkey, it was a period of economic decline for Korea as the Japanese directed
their efforts to the war. In 1945, the Japanese left and the country was
partitioned along the 38th paraLlel: the south and north got approximately
equal land (and arable land) areas, but the south got 17 million people,
contrasted with the north's 8.8 million. The result was that there were only
1,309 square meters of arable land per. capita in the South — the highest
density of population in the world at that time. The Americans occupied what
is now South Korea.
The north had been the source of most electric power and minerals,
and a very high fraction of manufactured output of metal and chemical
products, while the South had been predominant in textiles, processed foods,
and machinery. The economic disruption after the war and partition,
therefore, was probably as great, if not greater, than that of some of the
countries in which fighting had occurred. For example, it is estimatd that,
by 1948, production of textiles was only about 18 percent of what it had been
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in 1939; machinery production stood at 40 percent of its 1939 level, and
overall manufacturing production was about 14 percent of its 1939 level.
(Frank, Kim and Westphal, 1975, p. 26.) The real economic dislocations were
accompanied by a hyperinflation; the Seoul retail price index of 1949 was 123
times what it had been in June 1945.
Thus, Korea's wartime legacy was vastly worse than Turkey's, although
both countries had immediate reconstruction problems and low incomes. Both
countries were recipients of sizeable amounts of foreign aid from the United
States, starting in the immediate postwar years. But that is almost the only
similarity, and even there, Korea received proportionately much more aid than
Turkey. The events of the decade after the war ended in 1953 made the
contrast much stronger, with everything apparently favoring rapid Turkish
growth and hindering Korea's.
For Turkey, American aid under the Point Four Program and then the
Marshall Plan was directed largely toward the development of infrastructure
and agriculture. The government established very high support prices for
agricultural commodities, and, in addition, a sizeable fraction of aid was
allocated for the importation of tractors, and the conversion of pastureland
and forests in the Anatolean plateau into
wheat—growing areas. Wheat
production boomed at a time when world prices were high and European demand
was rising rapidly. By the early 1950s, Turkey was the largest exporter of
wheat in the world, exporting a net of 600 thousand metric tons in 1953 and
950 thousand metric tons in 1954 (Krueger, 1974, p. 43) while simultaneously
building up domestic stocks.2 The price supports translated rapidly into
heavy budgetary costs, which were a major cause of inflationary pressure in
the mid—1950s, but until 1953 were offset by Marshall Plan aid and export
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earnings at favorable terms of trade. It is estimated that Turkish real GNP
at 1961 prices rose 15 percent of 1951, 8.5 percent in 1952, and 11.2 percent
in 1953 —— exceptionally rapid growth by any standard.
The Korean economy's evolution over the 1946—53 period falls into two
parts. As already mentioned aid receipts were channeled toward reconstruction
efforts and attempts to mitigate the dislocations of partition. The U.S.
military occupation carried out a successful land reform program (see Mitchell
1952 for an account), and in addition assisted with educational reforms that
provided virtually universal primary education. Thus, although Korea's stock
of manpower and new entrants to the labor force in the late l940s were
probably less well educated than the Turkish labor force, the educational
reforms of the late 1940s laid a basis for rapid increase in educational
attainments in later years.
Spurred by reconstruction activities and an inflow of aid, Korean
output grew significantly until June 1950, although it probably did not
reattain the levels of the late 1930s. Per capita income figures are not
available, but an unweighted index of production,3 with 1946 equalling 100,
stood at 171 in 1948 and 149 in 1949 (although items that probably had large
weight in the index such as rice, wheat and barley were up only 20 percent
over their 1946 levels while items such as nails and chinaware had increased 4
and 8.5 times respectively).
However, whatever gains in output had been achieved by early 1950
were again lost with the outbreak of the Korean war, which lasted until mid—
1953. During those years, the excess demand generated by wartime expenditures
and by the demands of United Nations troops (including Turkish) intensified
inflationary pressures. Meanwhile, the initial invasion of large parts of
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South Korea by the north was repulsed by United Nations troops, only to be
followed by reinvasion, which was in turn followed by a final repulsion. The
fighting destroyed much of the infrastructure that had been rebuilt in the
late 1940s. When the war ended in 1953, the South Korean economy was once
again severely dislocated.
1.2 Political and Geopolitical Situations
It would take this essay too far afield to sketch in any degree of
depth the domestic and international political situations of the two countries
over the decades after 1953. But a few brief observations are
necessary.
First, the perceived threat from the North in Korea led toa degree
of cohesion in the Korean body politic that might otherwise have been
absent. There was a powerful imperative for economic development that arose
not only because of low living standards but also because of rivalry with the
North. This phenomenon may have permitted the government to pursue economic
goals more single—mindedly than might otherwise have been the case, but it
alsO had its costs: the large defense budget was one such cost. Second,
because of these same concerns, Korean foreign policy was firmly based on
alliance with the United States. The large aid inflows of the 1950s, and the
continued American military presence were consequences. Third, because of
memories of the colonial era, Korea did not even have formal relations with
Japan until 1965, when a formal treaty was signed, and Japan agreed to extend
what were in effect reparations. At least until 1965, proximity to rapidly
growing Japan was not a significant plus to Korea's growth, and the Japanese
share of Korean trade fell up to 1965.
Although Turkish proximity to the Soviet Union is not the same as the
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Korean partition, Turkey's strategic location nonetheless also determined her
international policy stance. Turkey has been a member of NATO and has
supported the largest army of any European NATO country, receiving military as
well as economic aid from the United States and Western European countries.
In terms of both trade and aid, the United States and Western Europe were the
dominant economies. Because of proximity as well as a commonality of religion
and heritage, there were also strong links to the Middle East.
As to domestic politics, Turkish elections in 1950 brought Adnan
Menderes to the Prime Ministership, and turned the Republican Peoples' Party
(RPP), the recipient of the Ataturk heritage, Out of office. This ended the
era of single—party rule in Turkey. Ataturk, who had beena general, had left
a strong legacy to the military, which regarded itself as the guardian of the
nation and of Ataturk's tradition. Menderes was reelected to office during
the 1950s in an environment that was regarded as increasingly oppressive and,
by the late 1950s, there were charges of a rigged election. In 196.0, the
military intervened, and sponsored the writing of a new Constitution which
took effect in 1961, when elections were held and a civilian government
returned to office- (with the RPP winning the 1961 election, and the Justice
Party, the successor to the Menderes heritage, winning election in 1965). The
military once again intervened in 1971, but again there followed a return to
civilian government and democracy under the 1961 constitution. Starting in
the mid—1970s, however, there were several years of increasing violence and a
deteriorating economy, with excessive and unsustainable borrowing.- The
government seemed unable to resolve either the economic or the political
issues, in part because neither of the two major parties could attain a
majority in Parliament and had to enter into a coalition with one of several
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minority parties. In late 1980, the military once more intervened. This
time, a new constitution was written, partly with the intention of reducing
the influence of the smaller parties, but also with a view to preventing a
recurrence of some of the apparent excesses of the l970s. When elections were
held in 1983, the civilian government under Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was
operating with somewhat smaller powers than had earlier elected regimes.
Thus, throughout the postwar period, the Turkish military was a major
presence in the country's political life. However, for the majority of time,
the government was democratically elected under a Constitution.
The Republic of Korea was founded in 1948, and Seungman Rhee became
President and remained in that office until 1960. The Rhee regime was aptly
characterized by Mason, Kim et al.: "Despite the existence of certain
trappings of democracy, the Rhee regime was indubitably an authoritarian
government..." (Masori,Kim et al., 1980, p. 44.)
In 1960, •a student revolution, with widespread support of other
groups, led to Rhee's resignation. A one—year interim government (clearly
democratically elected) was unable to maintain law and order, and was
overthrown after about a year by a military coup. General Park Chung Hee
became chairman of a military council that revised the constitution to permit
more centralized government in the expectation that centralization would
prevent the apparent excesses of the earlier government; elections were held
in late 1963. Although the opposition received 53 percent of the votes, it
was badly fragmented and Park was elected President, with his party
controlling 110 of 175 seats in the National Assembly. In subsequent
elections, Park was returned to office, first with a "landslide victory" in
1967 (Mason, Kim, et al., 1980, p. 51), which effectively endorsed the
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economic success of the regime, but then with lower fractions of the total
vote and more charges of voter irregularities. But the major turning point of
the political process came after the 1971 Presidential election, in which Park
was elected for a third term. In 1972, the Government, apparently alarmed by
the reduced margin of victory of popular support, abruptly abolished the
existing constitution and introduced a new one in which the procedure for
electing the President was converted to an indirect one, thus paving the way
for President Park's indefinite stay in power.
Park was assassinated in October 1979, after which there followed an
interim period of about a year before General Doo—Hwan Chun became
President. His government, which has ruled to the date of writing, has
announced that he will serve only one term as President, and held elections
for the Assembly in February 1985, which were intended to lead up to an
indirect national election in 1988 for determination of President Chun's
successor.
Even during the period when President Park's office had clearly been
won in a free and open election, all observers would agree that government and
power in Korea was highly centralized. And, fot periods including the late
l950s, and from the late 1970s to the present, the government has been
arguably authoritarian. Its basis of support, however, has been the challenge
from the North and its ability to deliver a strong economic performance.
Indeed, Mason, Kim et al. concluded that: "As long as the possibility of
aggression seemed real to a majority of the population and as long as
continued growth assured increased real incomes to both rural and urban
communities, the legitimacy of the Park Government in Korea was widely
accepted." (Mason, Kim, et al., 1980, p. 56.)
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1.3 Structure of the Two Economies, Mid—1950s
By the mid—1950s, the Korean war was over, and the reconstruction
effort begun, while the initial period of rapid growth in Turkey had ended and
the underlying macroeconomic imbalances were becoming increasingly evident.
It is thus useful to contrast the economic structures of the two countries at
that time as a starting point for later analysis.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 give an idea of some key magnitudes. The
population sizes of the two countries were very similar, each in excess of 20
million (see Table 1). Korea was by far the poorer country. By U.N.
estimates, the only Asian countries with lower per capita incomes in those
years were India and Burma. Turkey's estimated per capita income of $210 was
considerably higher than Korea's, although well below that of the richer Latin
American countries and lower than any other European country covered by the
U.N. estimates at that time. Thus, although both countries were poor, Korean
living standards were probably among the lowest in the world, while Turkey was
probably at the lower end of the spectrum of "middle income" developing
countries.
Table 2 gives some idea of the structure of production in both
countries in the mid—l950s. As can be seen, both were predominantly
agricultural: in Turkey, 74 percent of the population lives in rural areas,
and agricultural output accounted for 41.9 percent of national income
originating in agriculture, and 62 percent of the population living in rural
areas.
Despite this similarity, there was and is an important difference:
Turkey is relatively land—abundant, and Korea is land—scarce. Turkey is
favored with a variety of climatic conditions, including: I) the
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Mediterranean coast where cotton, citrus, tree crops (especially olive trees),
and fresh fruit and vegetables vie for rich land; 2) the Anatolean plateau,
colder and with somewhat poorer soil, which probably has a comparative
advantage in livestock and, to a lesser extent, wheat and other grains; and 3)
the Black Sea region, where tobacco and hazienuts are major crops. Turkey's
resources are so large that one would expect her to be a net exporter of
agricultural commodities throughout the development process: one foreign
visitor aptly suggested that "Turkey should be the California of Europe." In
addition to land, Turkey has large deposits of chrome, copper, coal, iron ore
and a variety of other minerals. However, there is very little oil, and the
country imports its entire supply.
By contrast, Korea had the smallest amount of arable land per capita
(and not necessarily good quality land) of any country in the world in the
l950s. Although the, country was a net exporter of rice to Japan in the 1930s,
that export reflected the realities of colonial administration; once land
reform was undertaken, Korea became a net importer of grains. Korean policy
toward agriculture in the 1960s was one of relative neglect; in the 1970s,
policy shifted toward protection for domestic food production, largely on
income distribution grounds. Korea is lacking in almost all mineral resources
— minerals and oil are major import items.
Table 3 gives data on the structure of expenditures in the two
countries in 1955. As can be seen, both had imports considerably in excess of
exports; in Turkey's case, foreign aid and other capital flows represented 2—3
percent of CNP in the l950s. In the Korean case, however, domestic savings
were very small, as foreign aid accounted for about 8 percent of GNP, or four—
fifths of 1955 investment.4
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Table 4 presents data on the composition of exports and imports in
the two countries. As can be seen, Turkey's exports were about 17 times
larger in total value than were Korea's. Turkey's exports were predominantly
agricultural, with cotton and tobacco the two leading agricultural export
commodities. Even so, Turkey's exports of minerals (primarily chrome and
copper) were three times as large as Korea's total exports. Other exports,
which in Table 4 are recorded as manufactures, constituted no more than 9
percent of total exports. By contrast, Korea's exports were so small that a
percentage composition table almost does not make sense. However, what
exports there were primarily minerals, with some forestry products and some
agricultural and fishery products (especially marine products) constituting
the balance.
One final aspect of trade structure deserves at least brief
mention. That is, the geographic pattern of trade. Table 5 gj.ves data on the
share of trading partners in Korean and Turkish exports and imports. As can
be seen, the United States is important for both countries, but much more so
for Korea. Reflecting their respective geographies, however, Japan was
relatively more important for Korea (although the Japanese share of Korean
exports fell by at least half over the subsequent decade) and Europe for
Turkey. The large "other" category for Turkey reflects the importance of
bilateral trading arrangements (especially with CMEA countries) in Turkey's
exports in the mid—1950s.
In sum, there were remarkable similarities between the two
countries. They were of approximately equal size in terms of population.
Both were heavily agricultural and had low per capita incomes, although
Korea's was considerably lower than Turkey's. Both had sizeable military
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expenditure burdens and were recipients of military and economic aid. Both
countries had periods of authoritarian rule and periods where the government
was legitimized by relatively free elections, although on average the Korean
government was considerably more centralized and authoritarian than the
Turkish.
There were also significant differences. Turkey had by far the more
generous resource endowment, both in terms of land per man in agriculture, and
in terms of other natural resources. And Turkey had the period from 1946
onward in which policies could focus at growth and efforts to raise living
standards. Korea, by contrast, had been much more devastated by the political
aftermath — i.e., partition and departure of the Japanese and the Korean War —
and was, in the mid—1950s, much less far ahead of the immediate postwar
situation than was Turkey.
2. Economic Policy Regimes
Turkey's economic performance until 1955 was regarded as one of the
most promising of any developing country, while Korea remained a war—
devastated country. Over the following 5 years, both countries pursued rather
similar economic policies, each with relatively unsatisfactory results. Those
policies are the subject of Sect. 2.1. In the late l950s, each embarked
upon
some needed policy reforms, although the centerpiece of the reform packages
and the scope and extent of reforms differed vastly. Those reform packages
are the subject of Sect. 2.2. In each case, the reform packages set the
pattern for the economic policies that were pursued throughout the 1960s,
which are discussed in Sect. 2.3. Section 2.4 then covers the reactions to
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the oil price increase of 1973, while Section 2.5 traces the shifts in
economic policy in each country since 1980.
2.1 Policies in the Late l950s
Turkish economic policy in the late l950s was driven by the
difficulties that arose out of the unsustainable and expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies that had been pursued in the early l950s; Korean economic
policy was formulated in response to the exigencies of postwar reconstruction
against the backdrop of heavy aid dependence. Interestingly, despite the
difference in origins, the resulting policies and problems were remarkably
similar. The difficulties in each instance manifested themselves in the
balance of payments.
As already seen, Korea was heavily dependent on American aid and
receipts from American military outlays to cover the import bill. Americans
in effect borrowed Korean currency to purchase local goods and services and to
provide American troops with domestic currency for local expenditures. At a
later date, negotiations were then held covering the exchange rate at which
the loan would be repaid in dollars. Inflation was rapid during the war
period, when prices as reflected in the cost of living index rose at rates of
167, 402, 126, and 53 percent, in the years 1950 through 1953 respectively.5
Despite that, the Korean authorities attempted to keep the nominal
exchange rate constant in the expectation of higher dollar receipts for won
loans. By the time the war ended, the exchange rate was thus already heavily
overvalued. Frank, Kim and Westphal (p. 32) estimate that, in 1965 constant
won per U.S. dollar, the official exchange rate (which had fluctuated between
180 and 250 in 1949) was only 55.6 won per dollar in August 1953 when the
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Korean was ended. Despite periodic devaluations, the real rate fluctuated
between a low of 55.7 and 154.8 in the years before 1960, and did not reattain
the 1949 level until the end of 1960. Thereafter, it was always well in
excess of 200 1965 constant won per dollar.
In response to the pressures that arose on the balance of payments,
the authorities took a number of measures: 1) there were multiple exchange
rates, with as many as eight different rates for different classes of
transactions in the late l950s; 2) there was extensive exchange control,
including licensing of all imports, which were not permitted unless they were
on a list of "eligible" commodities; and 3) tariffs and surcharges were
imposed on those commodities that were imported in an effort to contain excess
demand. There were numerous changes in regulations, and the overall exchange
regime was chaotic. Despite occasional efforts to provide some relief and
incentives to exporters, the discrimination against exports and in favor of
the domestic market was enormous. Among the consequences, there was
considerable import substitution in consumer—goods industries; in addition,
corruption increased among those trying to obtain imports which was a
significant factor in the downfall of President Rhee. Needless to say,
exports lagged badly as a consequence: even in 1960, korean exports were only
$33 million compared to $40 million in 1953, representing about 2.4 percent of
GNP.6
Underlying the erosion of the nominal exchange rate, of course, was
macroeconomic imbalance. Although annual inflation rates did not again reach
100 percent after 1953, the consumer price index rose more than 20 percent in
every year until 1958, and as much as 66 percent in 1955. At that time, these
rates were among the highest in the world.
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The origins of inflation lay in the government budget deficit and its
financing. As a percent of GNP, the budget deficit rose from 1.9 percent in
1953 to a peak of 7.6 percent in 1955 and remained at about that level until
1958. Once economic policy reforms began, it fell sharply. Budget deficits
were financed largely through credit creation, as financial markets were
almost nonexistent because of regulation. Nominal interest rates were
controlled at very low levels throughout the period, and were negative in real
terms until 1958 (see Kim and Roemer, 1979, p. 73).
The growth rate in Korea was lacklustre until 1960, despite the
opportunities present in a reconstruction era for rapid growth. In 1960, real
GNP is estimated to have been 589 billion won, compared to 422 bilLion won in
1953 —— an increase of 39 percent, or an average annual rate of less than 5
percent (Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics Yearbook, 1953/57, p.
16). Investment remained at about 10 percent of national income, and foreign
aid continued to finance the bulk of investment.
For Turkey, the origins of the macroeconomic difficulties lay in a
decision to maintain an exchange rate of TL2.8 per dollar in 1946. This rate
was manifestly unrealistic, given the Turkish inflation during the Second
World War. But the boom in wheat exports, the ability to run down reserves
that had earlier been accumulated, and the availability of Point Four and
Marshall Plan aid permitted maintenance of this rate for an extended period of
time. When commodity prices fell sharply in 1953, the government reacted by
imposing quantitative restrictions on imports —— no importer was to receive
permission to import more than a specified percentage of their preceeding
year's imports. From the point onward, excess demand for foreign exchange
increased as inflation persisted, but was contained through a complex set of
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regulations.7 The trade and payments regime became an extremely complex
amalgam of multiple exchange rates, with surcharges of different levels of
different categories of imports and export premia for specified exports,
import licensing, tariffs, bilateral trading arrangements, and export price
checks (see Krueger, 1974, Ch. 2 for a description).
There was little conscious "industrialization" policy in Turkey
during the L950s, but the foreign trade regime nonetheless provided a highly
protected domestic market to any domestic supplier of import competing
goods. The SEEs and private industry both increased their output fairly
rapidly until 1956. Almost all of it was in consumer goods, just as in the
Korean case. After 1956, inability to obtain raw materials, intermediate
goods, and spare parts severely constrained output of Turkish industry.
Even without inflation, foreign exchange difficulties would have been
acute, but there were inflationary pressures arising out of the budgetary
deficits incurred as a result of agricultural price supports and large public
expenditures on infrastructure. The budgetary deficits were aggravated by the
government's effort to suppress inflation by holding down the prices at which
SEEs could sell their output. The consequence was large losses by these
enterprises, which were financed by Central Bank credits, which further
fuelled inflation.
Price controls led to significant discrepancies between official
prices and market prices, so that inflation exceeded, and probably
substantially so, the rate recorded in official price indices. Even those
indices, however, record rates in excess of 20 percent for the years from 1955
to 1957.
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2.2 Economic Reforms of the Late 1950s and Early 1960s
In both Korea and Turkey, the economic policy stance of the mid—1950s
was unsustainable without a significant change in some key parameters. For
Korea, export earnings were stagnant, and growth could proceed only if that
situation would change or if foreign aid could be expected to grow
indefinitely. The United States had informed the Government of its intention
to reduce aid, which made prospects in the absence of policy change even
bleaker. Moreover, the government budget was sufficiently imbalanced that the
prospect would probably have been for an accelerating rate of inflation even
if aid levels had been sustained in the absence of measures to adjust
expenditures relative to income. Whereas for the Koreans, it was recognition
of the infeasibility of maintaining growth over the long—run which prompted
policy reform, for the Turks, reforms were forced upon them by the imperatives
of a balance of payments crisis.
Stated another way, in Turkey the option of changing the underlying
parameters of economic policy with respect to protection was not considered.
The role of state economic enterprises in the economy and the need for control
of economic activity was unquestioned, and there does not appear to have been
any significant group within Turkey advocating a significant shift in policies
of control and regulation. A deep—seated suspicion of private economic
activity and belief in the need for detailed regulation and control pervaded
Turkish society. While there was opposition to the changes in Korea with
dominant businessmen dependent on the restrictive trade regime and controls
for their profits, the change in government in 1960 seems to have led to the
formation of a consensus on the need for growth—oriented policies and an
export orientation. Once begun, President Park's commitment to growth, and
an IMF stabilization program in the summer of
major realignment of the exchange rate (from
dollar, although the change was implemented thr
subsidies on exports until it was legitimized
measures included credit and budgetary ceilings
import regime, and a rescheduling of the debt.
sizeable credit to permit a resumed flow o
Government, if there was an intention other
iflgtjtut
eligible
material S
1958. The centerpiece was a
TL2.8 per dollar to TL9 per
ough surcharges on imports and
in the summer of 1960). Other
an attempt to rationalize the
In addition, Turkey received a
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the highly visible success of the new policies assured the maintenance of the
strategy.
In the Turkish case, imports were financed by borrowing from abroad,
on ever—worsening terms, until finally even suppliers' credits were
unavailable to would—be importers. By the summer of 1958, harvests were left
in the fields in the absence of gasoline to power the tractors and the trucks
to bring produce to the ports and markets, and many activities were running at
far below capacity because of import shortages. Indeed, the situation could
be described as having been critical for at least a year before that time, but
the Menderes Government resisted policy reforms until it became apparent that
there would be no alternative.
The major Turkish policy reforms were carried out under the aegis of
f imports. The intent of the
than to satisfy international
creditors enough to be eligibile for resumed lending and foreign aid, was to
remedy the short—term macroeconomic imbalances.
Even the rationalization of the import regime took the form of
ing three semi—annual "import programs"; one program listed goods
for importation without quantitative restriction (mostly raw
and intermediate goods used in production where there was no
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domestic source of supply); one program listed quotas for imports of other
commodities; yet a third listed commodities that were eligible for importation
only under bilateral trading arrangements. Commodities not listed on any of
these were not legally importable.
The inauguration of regular import programs, and especially a
liberalized list represented a significant improvement over the chaotic
conditions that had prevailed when importers, even with valid licenses, had to
queue at the Central Bank for 6 and even 8 months in order to obtain a foreign
exchange permit. Nonetheless, the new system permitted the government to
liberalize or restrict the trade regime in accordance with the dictates of
foreign exchange availability and/or desires to protect domestic industry:
shifting of commodities to the quota list, or removing them from any list
automatically heightened restrictions. And, during the 1960s, shifts of this
Sort were a majør means by which domestic import substitution was
encouraged. T1e import programs remained the basic instrument of protection
for domestic industry throughout the following two decades. Once domestic
production of an item had begun, imports of the import—competing good were
placed on the "Quota List"; when production was deemed "adequate" to supply
the domestic market, the item was removed entirely from the import lists,
which meant that it could not legally be imported.
The Korean reforms started in 1957—8 with a first effort at
macroeonomic stabilization and the introduction of some export incentives.
Thereafter, the process of liberalization continued, and continues to this
day.8 Cutbacks in expenditures permitted a sharp reduction in the rate of
monetary expansion, and the rate of inflation plummeted from its 30—50 percent
range to virtually zero by 1959. In 1960 (after the Student Revolution),
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reforms of the trade and payments regime began. The initial effort was geared
primarly at stimulating exports: the official exchange rate was adjusted (for
the first time since 1955) and in addition tax rebates and a number of export
subsidies were introduced to compensate for the bias against export activities
that would otherwise have resulted from the tariff structure. After 1960, the
real exchange rate for exporters was kept relatively constant.
Along with the increased incentives for exporting, the Government
through its policy pronouncements assured exporters that those incentives
would be maintained. Over the next several years, these assurances were
accompanied by a number of policy measures that gave them credibility: 1) The
rates of export subsidies and tax incentives were adjusted periodically to
insure that exporters did not lose when inflation was not offset by exchange
rate changes. 2) Procedures were developed so that exporters could import
their needed raw materials and intermediate goods duty—free provided only that
they. reexported these materials within a year; indeed, the provisions were
sufficiently generous so that there was probably an element of subsidy in the
scheme. 3) Exporters were the only ones eligible to receive import licenses
and were thus the recipients of whatever premia there were on imports
(primarily consumer luxury goods). Finally, 4) exporters were extended highly
preferential treatment in receiving credit. Because of interest rate ceilings
and credit rationing, the real interest rates applicable were negative, at
least until 1965, and the value of credit was substantial.
Thus, the initial set of Korean reforms had two distinct parts: on
the one hand, there was a major effort to realign monetary and fiscal policy
in order to reduce the rate of inflation drastically; on the other hand, there
was a huge shift in incentives away from import substitution and toward export
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promotion.
Turkey and Korea were similar in that 1) they both started with trade
and payments regimes that were highly protective of import substitution
activities and discriminated against exports; 2) they had relatively high
rates of inflation (as seen from the perspective of the 1950s and 1960s) and
attempted to reduce excess demand; 3) new governments in 1960 were, if
anything, more committed to the economic programs and reforms than had been
their predecessors.
They differed in three respects: 1) The Turkish reforms were driven
by the exigencies of a balance of payments and debt crisis whereas the Korean
reforms were motivated largely by a commitment to economic growth through an
export—oriented strategy, given that aid flows could not be expected to
sustain the sort of growth of imports that would be essential for satisfactory
overall economic development.. 2) There was no real intent on the part of the
Turkish authorities to alter the underlying incentive structure of the economy
with regard to exportables and import substitutes. As pronouncements in the
First and Second Five—Year Plans amply demonstrate, it was intended to develop
industry as a leading sector through import substitution. 3) The Korean
Government recognized the role of incentives and was essentially pragmatic in
its efforts to stimulate economic performance whereas the Turks remained
highly suspicious of private economic activity and remained committed to a
policy regime based on direct controls.
2.3 Policies during the l960s
In both Korea and Turkey, policy during the l960s and l970s really
evolved in response to the perceived needs originating from the basic strategy
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that had already been decided upon. In Turkey, perceived needs originated
largely in foreign exchange difficulties; in Korea, perceived needs were
actions that would support the export drive.
In Turkey, the initial results of the 1958 reforms were highly
successful. The stabilization was accompanied by receipt of new credit which
financed a resumed flow of imports; partly for this reason, but also because
there was a good harvest, the initial response to the stabilization program
was a substantial increase in output, combined with a sharp reduction in the
rate of inflation (after an initial, once—and—for—all, increase in prices of
products of the SEEs). Perhaps because of that, the Menderes government began
exceeding the credit and budget ceilings agreed upon with the IMF by late
1959, and signs of inflation reappeared. In May 1960, a military coup removed
Menderes from office; interestingly, among the first actions of the new
government was to. reinstate the stabilization program.
Throughout the l960s, Turkish inflation remained moderate, averaging
just under 5 percent annually over the decade. Economic policy was
articulated in the First and Second Five—Year Plan, which set industrial-
ization as a major goal, to be achieved through import substitution. Aid in
support of Turkey's Development Plans constituted 2—3 percent of GNP during
most of the 1960s. The real exchange rate for traditional exports in 1958
prices, which had reached TL7.69 per dollar after the devaluation fell to
TL6.82 per dollar in 1963, and to TL5.45 per dollar by 1969. For non-
traditional exports, some subsidies were given to offset part of the
disincentive inherent in an appreciating real exchange rate, but nonetheless,
the real rate in 1958 prices fell from TL9 per dollar in 1958 to TL7.18 in
1965 and to TL6.00 by 1969 (see Krueger, 1974, p. 187).
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Exports responded to the significantly increased incentives which
resulted from the more realistic exchange rate in the early L960s: Turkish
exports, which were $396 million in 1953, had fallen to a low of $247 million
in 1958. They rose by over $100 million in 1959, and reached a level of $458
million in 1965. While this did not represent exceptionally rapid growth, the
availability of aid in addition to export earnings led to a fairly comfortable
balance of payments position, and the major motive for the import programs in
the first half of the 1960s was to protect domestic industry.
By the mid—l960s, however, the cumulative effect of inflation at
rates of 5 percent against the backdrop of stable international prices was
beginning to take its toll, and growth of export earnings slowed down
markedly. The government attempted to mitigate the situation by providing
export incentives, in the form of subsidies, for nontraditional exports, and
these grew somewhat more rapidly in the late 1960s. However, export earnings
from the traditional sources of foreign exchange — agricultural and minerals —
stagnated. Meanwhile, the import content of planned investment and output in
import substituting industries generally exceeded expectations, so that demand
for foreign exchange was rising rapidly.
With only slow growth in availability and more rapid growth in
demand, the import programs became increasingly restrictive in 1966, 1967, and
1968. Nonetheless, foreign exchange difficulties increased, so that by 1969
even those who had received import licenses under an Import Program were
waiting 6—8 months before they received their foreign exchange allocation from
the Central Bank. In this environment, incentives for producing domestic
substitutes of almost anything were very great: no competing imports were
permitted; those products dependent on imported raw materials or intermediate
— 28 —
goods had virtual monopoly positions as their shares of these materials were
determined by the import licensing regime. As foreign exchange availability
decreased, premia on import licenses rose, and growth rates fell in the late
l960s.
A devaluation in 1910 was aimed at providing more incentives for
exports. In the short run, it did so, but the authorities were unable to
sterilize the inflow of funds associated with repatriated workers' remittances
(who had earlier held their funds abroad) and with reverse capital flight. As
a consequence, inflation accelerated rapidly. Thus, despite the fact that
exports rose from $537 million in 1969 to $1,317 million in 1973, inflation as
measured by wholesale prices rose from a rate of 5.6 percent in 1970 to 19.8
percent in 1973.
Whereas Turkish economic policy with regard to the relative
incentives for exportable and import—competing .production was driven largely
by foreign exchange availability, Korean economic policy in the l960s and
early 1970s was determined largely by the desire to maintain the momentum of
the export drive. Once the export incentives were in place, they were
generally altered in order to maintain their constancy in real terms: the
real effective exchange rate for exports hardly changed from 1960 to 1968,
although the exchange rate itself was pegged in the early l960s and floated
after 1964, and the fraction of the real rate that originated in export
incentives (including tax rebates, export subsidies, and subsidized credit)
varied widely. Over time, there was a trend toward greater reliance on the
exchange rate, and less on individual incentive schemes, than had earlier been
the case. Over time, too, the real effective exchange rate began to be
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adjusted in response to the degree to which export performance was deemed to
be flagging or unsustainably rapid.
In support of this general thrust, however, further reforms were
undertaken in the 1960s. In 1961, a major overhaul of the protective system
was undertaken, as quantitative restrictions were largely replaced by
tariffs. In 1964, budgetary reforms consolidated the government accounts and
increased fiscal discipline with the result that the inflation rate fell from
about 30 percent in 1963 and 1964 to 6 percent in 1965, and remained under 20
percent for the remainder of the l960s; in the same year, financial reforms
resulted in positive real interest rates to depositors for the first time in
the postwar period and reduced the degree of subsidy in official lending
rates. In 1967, imports were further liberalized, as the earlier positive
list of imports was replaced by a negative list (i.e., one that specifically
itemized those goods that may not be imported).
As mentioned earlier, American aid was phased Out during the 1960s.
Until 1966, Korean policy largely discouraged foreign investment and foreign
borrowing. But with decreased aid flows, the government reversed its stance
and began to encourage private capital inflows, initially in the form of bank
lending. These inflows were carefully controlled, with the government
deciding upon the aggregate amount of borrowing that would be permitted and
reviewing individual applications for it. After 1970, somewhat greater
encouragement was given also to direct foreign investment, although it has
remained relatively small contrasted with borrowing.
In all of this effort, however, the export drive was central.
Monthly joint meetings of government officials and businessmen were held,
chaired by President Park, in which export performance, industry by industry
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was reviewed. In cases where exports appeared to be lagging, inquiry was made
as to the difficulties; officials were in many instances then directed to
remove restrictions or otherwise facilitate performance. In the Korean
system, government officials tried to keep low targets for their industries
(because higher targets meant more work for them), and had every incentive to
facilitate private economic activity, the opposite of the incentive system in
many import substitution regimes, including the Turkish.
No measure of the biases of the two regimes can capture the
difference between them, largely because the commitment of the Korean
government provided a degree of assurance to exporters that was probably more
valuable than some of the incentives that are measurable. Nonetheless, for
the study on Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development, the bias of the
Turkish and Korean regimes was estimated as of the early 1960s: for Korea, it
was estimated that in 1966, the relative price of import—competing goods to
exportables in the domestic market was .94 times that in the international; in
Turkey in 1969, it was about 3.01 times as great.
Moreover, the variation in effective exchange rates and effective
rates of protection was much greater in Korea than in Turkey. Table 6 gives
some estimates. Although both means and variances are affected by the degree
of disaggregation and the coverage of the estimates, the data in Table 6 give
an idea of the difference between the Turkish and Korean regime. In many
sectors, the incentive for exporting in Korea was greater than the incentive
for sale in the domestic market; the opposite was the case only when there
were very few exports. Moreover, there was only one sector where the average
rate of protection exceeded 80 percent; the next highest was 20 percent, and
the range was from a negative 20 percent to a positive 20 percent. In Turkey,
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by contrast, almost all incentives were for production inthe internal market;
there was probably no sector in which the incentive to export even equalled
that to sell domestically. And, as between activities, the range of
incentives varied 10—fold, or by 1000 percent, with variances commensurately
great.
There can be little doubt, based not only on the data in Table 6, but
also on other evidence, that the Korean incentive structure was much more
uniform across activities than was the Turkish, and that the average incentive
to export was probably at least as great as that to produce for the domestic
market. This contrasts sharply with Turkey's inner—oriented policies.
2.4 Response to the Oil Price Increase
As was mentioned in Sect. 1.3, neither Turkey nor Korea has any
significant amount of oil. Consequently, the terms of trade of both countries
were seriously affected by the oil price increase of 1973—74, although the
prices of Turkey's primary commodity exports rose as a partial offset to the
oil price increase. Relative to 1972, Korea experienced a 23 percent
deterioration in her terms of trade by 1974 (based on export and import unit
values) contrasted with Turkey's 20 percent drop. Because trade was much more
important in Korean GNP, the total impact on Korea was much greater than on
Turkey.
The policy response of the two countries was quite different.' In
part because reserves were high and the response to the 1970 devaluation was
still improving the balance of payments, the Turkish government did virtually
nothing in the short run. By comparison, the Korean reaction was immediate
and sharp. In Turkey, the nominal exchange rate was adjusted only with
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significant lags despite the rapid inflation; in 1976, the nominal exchange
rate was TL16.67 per dollar as compared with TL14.93 at the end of 1970,
although the price level was almost triple its 1970 level. Even after
adjusting for inflation in dollar prices, the real price of foreign goods had
fallen 40 percent relative to domestic output in the 6—year period.
As inflation was seen to be a major policy problem, the domestic
price of energy was restrained. No significant alterations were made in the
key parameters confronting the private sector, and public expenditures and the
tax structure were not altered. In the absence of any marked policy response
to the oil price increase, the initial impact was, therefore, a significant
increase in the current account deficit: after a current account surplus of
$660 million in 1973, there were deficits of $561 million, $1,648 million, and
$2,029 million in the ensuing three years.
The Korean policy response was substantially more complex. The
nominal effective exchange rate for exports was increased from 310 won per
dollar in 1970 to 398 in 1973 and 484 in 1975. This adjustment more than
compensated for the differential between domestic and foreign inflation so
that the purchasing power parity effective exchange rate for exports was
increased from 308 won per dollar in 1970 to 396 won at the end of 1973; even
at the end of 1975, it still stood at 321 won per dollar, a higher real rate
than had prevailed at any time in the 1960s.9 On the import side, the
adjustment was even greater; the PPP PLD EER had been 260 in 1970, rose to 332
in 1973 but then fell back to 287 by 1975.
In addition to raising the real exchange rate, the domestic price of
energy was adjusted promptly, with some adjustments in domestic tax rates
undertaken to offset the impact on low—income groups. Also, systematic
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efforts were begun to find new sources of foreign exchange earnings, and the
Government actively encouraged Korean efforts to develop a market, especially
in the Middle East, in construction activities.
Despite these adjustment measures, a large jump in the current
account deficit and a sharp increase in inflation were both triggered by the
oil price increase. The government was able to increase borrowing in the
international private capital market to cover the current account deficit;
with that, growth promptly resumed.
The Korean economy suffered a year of relatively slow growth in 1974,
but then resumed rapid growth in 1975. Gaining confidence from her ability to
withstand the oil price increase but recognizing that the increased oil price
would increase the need for earning and saving foreign exchange, policymakers
concluded that Korea was ready to enter the "next stage" of development, and
undertook measures to start development of "heavy industries", including
machine tools, shipbuilding, and an array of other engineering industries.
For Turkey, the period 1976—79 was one of increasing short—term
macroeconomic imbalance, as expansionary demand policies resulted in an
acceleration of inflation, the balance of payments situation worsened, and the
rate of growth diminished, so that per capita income began falling by 1978.
Even without the oil price increase of 1979, the Turkish government would have
been unable to sustain its macroeconomic policy stance (including exchange
rate policies and the trade regimes as well as fiscal, monetary, and domestic
credit policies). There were simultaneously mounting political difficulties,
as domestic violence increased, and the Government was unable to come to grips
with either the political or the economic problem.
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In January 1980, the Government announced a series of far—reaching
reforms, starting with a massive devaluation and an announcement that
henceforth there would be frequent adjustments in the exchange rate to keep
pace with differentials between domestic and foreign inflation. In addition,
prices of outputs of public sector enterprises were increased sufficiently to
reduce their deficits and thus sharply cut the size of the public sector
deficit.
This general stance of reform, begun under the Demirel government,
was continued under the military government headed by General Evren which took
power in September 1980. In 1983, however, after some abrupt bankruptcies in
the financial markets following very high nominal arid real interest rates, the
leadership of economic policy was changed, and with it, the fiscal—monetary
stance was eased. With the election of late 1983, however, Prime Minister
Ozal, who had earlier led the reform effort, resumed the reform program.
Quantitative restrictions on imports were virtually eliminated; efforts were
made to rationalize, and perhaps even privatize, some of the State Economic
Enterprises; and a variety of moves to increase currency convertibility,
liberalize the credit market and banking system, and open up the economy were
gradually undertaken.
In Korea, the strains placed upon the economy by the expansionary
policies pursued to develop develop the heavy engineering and chemical
industries were already becoming apparent in 1977 and 1978: the demand for
some types of technically—trained personnel rose so rapidly that real wages
and salaries for skilled labor tripled within a 3—year period and the
differential between wages of skilled and unskilled workers rose
substantially; the investment and import Costs of the new factories were
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extremely high; partly for that reason and partly for concern about the
financial implications to domestic producers who were indebted in foreign
currency, the won was not revalued to maintain purchasing power parity with
major competitors; and, with a few exceptions (most notably shipbuilding), the
new enterprises tended to incur large losses and to operate at small fractions
of their intended capacity. Difficulties were compounded by the oil price
increase of 1979, and then the political uncertainties that followed the
assassination of President Park Chun Hee. By late 1980, the economy was in
severe macro imbalance — real GNP growth in that year was minus 6.4 percent.
The wholesale price index increased 40 percent from December 1979 to December
1980, the current account deficit jumped to 9 percent of GNP and the rate of
gross investment was virtually zero for the last half of the year.
Policies were set in place to address these issues. These included
an •exchange rate realignment, and also a concerted effort to restore
macroeconomic balance. Monetary growth, which had been 27 percent in 1980,
fell to 15 percent in 1983 and 8 percent in 1984; the fiscal, deficit
simultaneously fell to 1 percent of GNP by 1983. The GNP growth rate returned
to the 7 percent range, the deficit on current accounts had been reduced to 1.7
percent of GNP by 1984, and inflation was down to 2 percent at an annual rate.
Thus, both Korea and Turkey entered the early 1980s with economic
problems resulting from past policies as well as the effects of worldwide
recession and 1979 oil price increase. In the Korean case, the source of the
difficulty was the attempted shift of industrial base toward heavy chemical
and engineering industries and the other policies, especially exchange rate,
that had been adopted in support of that stance. In Turkey, the problems
essentially had their origins in the inner—oriented policies that had been
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pursued for several decades; the oil price increases and other events of the
l970s had exacerbated the underlying inefficiencies of the economy, but
adjustments to those phenomena could not be undertaken independently of
addressing the underlying issues.
3. Contrasts in Performance
Table 7 provides data on overall economic performance. As can be
seen, real GNP in Korea increased six—fold between 1960 and 1984, whereas
Turkish CNP rose at about half that rate. Turkish growth in the 1960s had
been somewhat less rapid than Koreats, but the difference became much more
pronounced in the l970s, and especially the late 1970s.
The differential in per capita incomes rose even more sharply than
that of GNP. Although both coutnries had rates of population growth of around
2.9 percent in the late l950s, the Turkish rate fell only to 2.5 percent in
the late l960s and 2.1 percent in more recent years. By contrast, the Korean
population's growth rate had already fallen to around 2 percent by 1970 and to
1.6 percent by the late l970s and early 1980s. Whereas Korea and Turkey each
had populations of just over 20 million in the early 1950s, the Turkish
population is estimated to have been 48.27 million in 1984, while Korea's was
40.58 million. It will be recalled that estimated per capita incomes (in 1955
prices) were $70 and $210 for Korea and Turkey respectively in the first half
of the 1950s, a differential which increased during that decade. By 1983, per
capita incomes in 1983 dollars were estimated to be $1,240 for Turkey and
$2,010 for Korea. Whereas Turkey's estimated per capita income was about
three times Korea's in the early l950s, it was only about 60 percent of
Korea's by the early l980s. While international comparisons of living
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standards are always subject to difficulty, there is little question that
Korea was the poorer country in the 1950s and the more affluent in the 1980s.
This fundamental transformation affected all sectors of the
economy. As can be seen from Table 8, agricultural production as well as
industrial production rose more rapidly in Korea than in Turkey, although
manufacturing was unquestionably the leading growth sector. Interestingly, in
both Korea and Turkey, agriculture's share in GNP fell sharply: from 36.5
percent to 13.9 percent between 1960 and 1984 for Korea and from 37.5 to 18.4
percent over the same years for Turkey. But despite the sharper fall in
Korea, agricultural production was almost 2.5 times as great in 1985 as in
1960, whereas in Turkey, agricultural production rose a still respectable, but
nonetheless substantially smaller, 62 percent. For manufacturing, the
structural shift was sharper in Korea; whereas 13.7 percent of GNP originated
in manufacturing in 1960, the 1984 figure was 29.2 percent (with an estimated
increase in manufacturing output of 1255 percent). In Turkey, the
manufacturing share increased from 11.6 to 23.0 percent of CNP, for a total
increase of 548 percent. Thus, it was not that manufacturing growth led in
one country while agricultural growth led in another: manufacturing rose more
rapidly in both countries, but the dominant phenomenon was Korea's faster
overall growth.
This faster growth implied, among other things, a much more rapid
increase in real wages and urban employment in Korea than in Turkey. Table 9
provides some estimates of the orders of magnitude of the increase. For
Korea, real wages had been virtually stagnant in the late l950s, and remained
so in the early l960s, although nonfarm employment rose rapidly, from 2.15
million in 1960 to 3.14 million in 1965. After 1965, nonfarm employment
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continued to grow at rates of almost 10 percent annually, but real wages also
began rising. By 1970, real wages had risen about 45 percent over their 1960
level. Thereafter, as labor became scarcer, more of the increase in demand
for labor was reflected in a rising real wage —— which more than doubled
between 1970 and 1980 —— while nonfarm employment grew more slowly, although
it almost doubled over the decade.
Data for Turkey are incomplete, but over the entire two decades after
1960, nonfarm employment is estimated to have risen only from 2.8 million to
about 5.7 million (compared to 2.1 million to 8.59 million in Korea), and real
wages at most rose by about 60 percent. Even then, real wages increases had
been caused in part by the political impasses and the power of unions in
Turkey to obtain wage increases independently of conditions in the labor
market; such increases as there were were at the expense of expanded
employment. There is considerable evidence that much of the effort of
employers in the late l970s was to find ways to automate their factories and
reduce their vulnerability to strikes and labor agitation. One of the
unfortunate but probably
l980s was the decline in
Rapid growth in
employment opportunities,
society. Indeed, except
and the period of "heavy
would suggest that the
egalitarian at the beginn
available evidence would
unequal in the 1950s, and
essential parts of the Turkish reforms of the early
real wages that took place.
Korea was reflected not only in rising real wages and
but also in rising real incomes for all segments of
for the early 1960s when the evidence is ambiguous
industry emphasis" in the late l970s, the evidence
Korean income distribution, which was relatively
ing of the period, became more so. By contrast, the
suggest that Turkish income distribution was more
became even more so with growth.1°
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The biggest contrast is in export performance of the two countries.
Data are given in Table 7. In 1960, Korea's exports were on $33 million,
compared to Turkey's exports of over $300 million. By 1984, Korea's exports
were $29.2 billion, and Turkey's were $7.13 billion. In both cases, the
composition of exports had changed; by 1984, almost 94 percent of Korean
exports were manufactures, whereas for Turkey the number was 54 percent. And,
whereas exports represented only 2.4 percent of Korean GNP in 1960, they were
38.4 percent of Korean GNP in 1984. By contrast, Turkish exports were about 4
percent of GNP in 1960, 6 percent of GNP in 1978, and 10 percent of GNP in
1984. To be sure, the relative importance of imports to the domestic economy
had also increased in the Korean case.
Of course, the expansion of manufactured exports in Korea was the
main stimulus to industrial growth. Korean Industrial production rose 45 fold
•over the 23 years after 1960; Turkish industrial prod.uction in 1983 was 6.6
times what it had been 23 years earlier. The data in Table 8 show vividly the
difference in performance.
Along with Korea's export performance came creditworthiness and her
ability to access international capital markets. As Table 10 shows, a major
part of the structural transformation in Korea was the rapid rise in the
domestic savings rate — from only eight—tenths of one percent of CNP in 1960
to well over 20 percent in the late l970s and around 20 percent in the early
1980s. It will be recalled that real, interest rates had been negative in the
late 1950s; financial reforms in the rnid—1960s assured savers •of positive real
returns on their savings, and the savings rate began rising dramatically.
Even so, it proved highly profitable to attract foreign capital,
especially in the late l960s and early 1970s. As can be seen from Table 10,
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Korea's capital inflows were much more important relative to GNP than were the
Turkish — and Korea's were mostly private inflows whereas much of Turkey's was
official. fInancing which was negotiated to cover balance of payments
difficulties. For Korea, foreign capital augmented domestic savings by as
much as 60 percent in the late 1960s — permitting an investment rate well in
excess of 25 percent of CNP while domestic savings rates were still below
20. For Turkey, by contrast, capital flows have remained 2—3 percent of GNP,
and Turkish investment, which was initially a much higher fraction of GNP than
was Korean, has not exceeded 20 percent.
It should be noted, however, that the difference in savings
performance has been far smaller than the difference in growth rates — the
greater difference has been the efficiency with which investment was allocated
and employed.
There is also an interesting contrast on the macroeconomic front. As
the last two columns of Table 10 show, until the 1970s, Korea's inflation rate
generally exceeded the Turkish. Both countries experienced accelerating
inflation right after the 1973 and 1979 oil price increases, although Turkey
was in any event undergoing a period of accelerating inflation during the
latter part of the 1970s. After 1980, it was a major objective of policy in
both countries to bring inflation under control, although in the Turkish case,
this objective was combined with that of opening up the economy. As the
numbers in Table 10 show, Turkey continued to experience double—digit
inflation rates, with rates of around 50 percent in 1984 and 1985. By
contrast, in Korea the rate of inflation is estimated to have fallen to less
than 1 percent annually in 1984 and 1985.
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4. Conclusions and Postscript
There are too many factors at work influencing economic performance
in any given country, or any pair of countries, for analysis to permit
ironclad conclusions. Nonetheless, the contrast between Korea and Turkey is
striking. By almost any measure, Turkey was the more affluent country in the
1950s, and better positioned for economic development. Her natural resources
were far superior; her initial savings rate and level of per capita income was
higher; and her record of growth during the 1950s appeared exceptionally good.
Korea in the l950s was unable to grow rapidly despite the
opportunities for above—average growth that usually arise in the aftermath of
a war. Her savings rate was exceptionally low, and her export performance was
very bad. The country's per capita endowment of natural resources was also
poor.
Insofar as there are either economic advantages or economic
disadvantages to a military alliance with the United States, both countries
had them. And, insofar as proximity to a rapidly growing region of the world
affects growth, Turkey and Korea had Europe and Japan, respectively.
Both countries in the 1950s were subject to macroeconomic imbalances
and rates of inflation that were then regarded as very high by world
standards. Both adopted reforms in the late 1950s and early L960s. In the
Korean reforms, the trade regime was central, and shifting its orientation was
the lasting achievement of the period. Inflation did decelerate, and shifts
in the government budget and rising real interest rates encouraged domestic
savings. These were significant shifts, but the centerpiece was the shift in
toward an outer—oriented trade regime. Korean analysts suggest that there was
a fair degree of unanimity in the view that Korea could no longer depend on
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aid and that there was no choice but to make the outer—orientation work.
While U.S. aid officials and others participated in the discussions and
decisions (and may have been instrumental in convincing policymakers that
there was a feasible alternative), the decisions of the late l950s appear from
all accounts to have been Korean decisions.
By contrast, by mid—1958 the Turkish government recognized that the
economic situation was unsustainable, but only in the sense that economic
activity was severely disrupted because import flows had virtually ceased.
Reforms were adopted only reluctantly and only because there appeared to be no
other way to reschedule debt and to provide for a resumed flow of imports that
was deemed essential to halt the decline in economic activity.
While rationalization of the chaotic trade regime that had preceeded
protection accorded to domestic firms increased and Turkey became, if
anything, more inner—oriented with the passage of time.
If there are any central lessons from the contrast of Korea and
Turkey, they are probably two. First, the prevailing economic structure of a
country can never be taken as a given; it must be seen in light of the
the August 1958 program was clearly an objective of policy, there was no
intention whatsoever to open up the economy, or to abandon the traditional
suspicion of private economic activity. Partly because there was little faith
in the efficacy of incentives, and partly because of the belief indirect
controls, the aims were purely for macroeconomic balance. There was no
intention to alter the balance of incentives between exportable and import—
competing production. While Turkey was, during the l960s, probably more
successful in maintaining price stability than was Korea, the degree of
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economic incentives that arise from the policy environment and condition
peoples' behavior. Secondly, there is an important difference between
"liberalization" efforts where the sole intent is to remove some of the bias
against exports that existed in the last phase of a balance—of—payments crisis
and a reform effort aimed at fundamentally altering the bias of the trade
regime.
In this regard, it is important to note that there were significant
mistakes made by Korean policy makers. It is not that economic policy in one
country was "right", and the other "wrong". If there was a difference in
policy formulation itself, it rather lay in the speed with which policymakers
recognized their mistakes and dealt with them. By the early 1980s, all
members of the Korean economics community were agreed that the effort to
promote heavy industry had been a mistake; there were incipient debt—servicing
difficulties in 1969 and on several later occasions. The problems were
rapidly identified in each instance, and efforts were then made to insure that
the same mistakes would not be repeated. Likewise, Korean performance has not
been without its drawbacks: import liberalization has proceeded only slowly
and reluctantly, and financial liberalization is still far from completed.
Turkey's economic difficulties were clearly apparent to all observers
in 1957, in 1969, and by 1976. Yet in each instance, the fact that the
economy was inner—oriented permitted policymakers to persist in "patch—up"
efforts rather than to address their fundamental problems. In one sense, the
outer—orientation of the Korean trade regime must be given the fundamental
credit for the more satisfactory Korean performance than the Turkish. At a
deeper level, however, it might be argued that it was the Korean policymakers'
willingness to confront their problems and to recognize difficulties early
which, on one hand, led to the decision for an outer—oriented trade strategy,
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and on the other hand, led them to address perceived difficulties more
quickly, and perhaps more importantly more fundamentlally, than did the
Turkish policymakers.
Turkey's effort at a shift to a more outward—orientation began in the
winter of 1980. Even then, quantitative restrictions were not removed, and
the major shift was through the guarantee to maintain a more realistic
exchange rate. Although those in authority clearly recognized the need for a
fundamental change in economic policy, there were many influential Turks, in
and out of government, who did not accept the changes.
Nonetheless, the commitment to an outer oriented regime has continued
to the time of writing. Against the background of worldwide recession, Turkey
has liberalized quantitative restrictions substantially, and maintained real
incentives for exporters. Export performance in consequence has been
impressive, with exports (which stood at only $2.9 billion in 1980) rising to
$7.1 billion in 1984. Performance has been impressive enough to persuade many
Turks that the earlier suspicion of private economic ativity may have been
overdone.
While the commitment to an outer oriented regime has been much less
firm than was the Korean two decades earlier, there has been enough success to
provide some momentum for its continuation. Whether initial successes with
the shift will have resulted in enough of a shift in Turkish thinking, or
whether the next shift in political power will reverse the liberalization
achieved so far, remains to be seen.
The centrality of trade policy in both Korea and Turkey is beyond
dispute. The experience of these two countries vividly demonstrates the
central importance of trade policy, and the importance of analyses of the sort
pioneered by Max Corden, in affecting countries' economic well being.
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Table 1. Comparative Data on the Korean and Turkish Economies, 1952—4
Population NNP Per Capita Income
(million) (US$ million) (dollars)
Korea 21.38 1,500 70
Turkey 22.46 4,717 210
SOURCE: United Nations, Per Capita National Product of Fifty—Five Countries:
1952—54, Statistical Series E, No. 4, New York.
Table 2. Structure of Output, Korea and Turkey 1955
(percentage of CNP)
Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Other
Korea 44.8 11.2 3.0 41.0
Turkey 41.9 5.8 38.1
a Includes all industry.
SOURCES: Korea: Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics Yearbook, 1953—67,
Seoul, 1968.
Turkey: State Planning Organization, First Five Year Plan, 1963—
1967, Ankara 1964, p. 13.
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Table 3. Structure of Expenditures, Turkey and Korea 1955
(percentage of GNP)
Government
Consumption Investment Consumption Exports Imports
Korea 86.4 12.3 8.7 1.6 9.8
Turkey 74.0 14.0 15.0 4.3 6.6
SOURCE: Krueger, p. 12 and Korea, Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics
Yearbook, 1953—1967, p. 10
Table 4. Composition of Exports, Korea and Turkey 19551
Total Agricultural Mineral Manufactured
Exports Exports Exports Exports
($mil.) (percentage of total exports)
Korea 17.6 23.4 51.6 25.0
Turkey2 305.0 75.3 15.7 9.0
SOURCES: Korea: Wontack Hong, Factor Supply..., Table A.11 and A.12
Turkey: Krueger, p. 182.
Notes: 1 The commodity classification may not be identical for the two
2
countries.
Turkish data are for 1956.
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Table 5. Geographic Distribution of Exports and Imports, 1955
(percentages)
Korea Turkey
Exports Imports Exports Imports
United States 41.9 34.9 15.5 22.4
Japan 39.1 14.7 0.3 0.7
EC 0.7 19.7 43.1 38.1
Other Europe 2.1 5.3 5.8
Middle East 5.8 6.7
Other 18.3 28.6 30.0 26.3
SOURCE: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1955.
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Table 6. Estimated Incentive Levels in Korea and Turkey, 1968
a. Korea. Effective Subsidy Rates
(percent)
For Domestic
For export Industry Average
Agriculture, forestry and
fabrics
—9.4 21.7 21.3
Processed food 1.8
—19.6
—18.0
Beverages and tobacco 12.6
—20.8
—19.5
Mining and energy 2.7 4.5 4.1
Construction materials 44
—12.9
—12.1
Intermediate products I 26.0
—21.9
—15.7
Intermediate products II 11.6 13.1 13.0
Nondurable consumer goods 4.1
—15.7
—11.2
Consumer durables 1.5 23.6 19.5
Machinery 1.9 21.0 20.2
Transport equipment —5.6 80.8 80.3
b. Turkey Domestic Resource Costs (TL per dollar)
Mean Variance Mean Variance
Food & beverages 14.11 46.06 Chemicals 14.56 16.92
Textiles 13.48 43.77 Cement 14.80 6.26
Forest products 10.44 n.a. Glass & ceramics 10.80 28.35
Leather products 10.24 n.a. Iron & steel 13.68 29.70
Paper products 23.69 67.40 Iron & steel products 93.87 43,737.12
Rubber products 45.59 890.49 Other metal products l.l7 22.89
Plastic products 37.05 843.90 Machinery & parts 21.81 139.31
Transport equipment 27.78 278.88
SOURCES: a. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Table 10—3. Subsidies were computed
under the Corden treatment of home goods.
b. Krueger, 1974, Table VIII—1.
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Table 7. Indicators of Economic Performance
Korea and Turkey, 1960—1984
Per Capita
Real GNP Income Exports
Korea Turkey Korea Turkey Korea Turkey
(1960 = 100) (1960 = 100) ($ Billion)
1961 105.6 102.0 102.6 99.4 .041 .341
1962 107.9 108.3 101.9 102.9 .055 .381
1963 117.7 118.8 108.1 110.2 .087 .368
1964 1.29.0 1.23.6 115.1. 111.9 .119 .411
1965 136.5 1.27.5 119.0 111.8 .175 .464
1966 153.9 142.8 131.2 122.7 .250 .491.
1967 164.1 148.8 134.5 125.3 .320 .522
1968 182.6 158.7 146.2 130.0 .455 .496
1969 207.7 167.3 162.7 133.7 .622 .537
1970 223.6 177.0 171.3 137.9 .835 .588
1971 243.1 194.9 182.7 148.1 1.068 .677
1972 257.0 209.5 189.5 155.2 1.624 .885
1973 293.4 220.8 212.5 159.5 3.225 1.317
1974 315.9 237.1 224.9 167.1 4.460 1.532
1975 337.8 255.9 236.5 L75.6 5.081 1.401
1976 385.5 275.6 265.6 185.3 7.715 1.960
1977 434.5 294.9 294.8 194.3 10.047 1.753
1978 476.7 286.5 318.5 184.9 12.711 2.288
1979 507.7 293.9 321.0 185.8 1.5.055 2.261
1980 481.3 290.9 311.9 180.0 17.505 2.910
1981 511.1 302.8 326.0 181.8 21.254 4.703
1982 539.9 316.5 339.1 188.0 21.873 5.746
1983 592.2 327.2 365.7 1.90.0 24.445 5.728
1984 636.2 346.7 387.6 201.3 29.244 7.134
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 1985
Yearbook and Per Capita Income.
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Table 8. Indices of Agricultural and Manufacturing Production,
1960—1984
(1960 = 100)
Agricultural Production Industrial Production
Korea Turkey Korea Turkey
1961 110 102 105 105
1962 102 106 139 106
1963 112 110 158 122
1964 132 117 170 159
1965 134 110 180 176
1966 144 125 226 215
1967 136 127 292 238
1968 138 134 397 266
1969 158 134 479 298
1970 156 139 535 305
1971 160 149 623 337
1972 166 153 724 373
1973 170 142 982 434
1974 178 158 1268 468
1975 202 169 1515 506
1976 220 181 1997 556
1977 236 183 2405 601
1978 252 186 2976 616
1979 258 190 3335 584
1980 210 192 3271 554
1981 232 195 3709 599
1982 238 203 3882 628
1983 240 203 4500 662
1984 250 208 n.a. n.a.
SOURCES: World Bank EPD databank. For Korea, statistics from Bank of Korea
National Income, supplemented by IBRD Economic Report, various
issues; Turkey — data from State Planning Organization.
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Table 9. Real Wages and Employment, 1957—1984
1957
1958
1959
1.960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Real wages8
19 70=100
54 •8
61.3
62.5
57.3
60 •5
60.8
57.9
54 •9
56.8
59.0
65.5
72 •8
89.7
100 •0
109.2
111.4
119.5
133.9
133 •5
151.8
175.8
206.3
226.4
213.3
206.0
225.8
245.1
259.1
NonE arm
Employmentb
(millions)
2.01
1.95
1.94
2.15
2.55
2.58
2.72
2.81
3.14
3.30
3.65
4.00
4 • 26
4.63
5.05
5.22
5.51
5.88
6 • 23
6.70
7.28
7.95
8 • 31
8.59
8.89
9.61
10 • 20
10.51
n.a.
n.a.
n•a.
72.2
77.6
78.9
85.2
90.7
91.3
87.8
90.4
98.1
100.0
93.5
90.7
98.3
99.7
103 • 4
1.18.2
125.2
105.9
95.1
71.1
65.7
63.0
66.6
68.1
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2.90
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
3.68
3.68
n.a.
n.a.
fl • a.
4.61
4.82
5.02
5.20
5.43
5.63
5.64
5.72
5.79
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Notes: a Source: Kim and Roemer (1979) for 1957—1975.
b
source: Kim and Park, p. 13, for 1963—1982.C Source: IBRD Policies & Prospects for Growth, 1980, p. 145.
Real wage data updated from Vgur Korum, "Turkish Export Structure
and Foreign Trading Companies in Outer Oriented Framework," mimeo,
October 1985.
Korea Turkey
Real wagesC
1970=100
Nonagricu1tur1
Employment—
(miLlions)
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Table 10. Savings Investment, Capital Flows, and Inflation,
1960—1984
Domestic Gross
Gross Savings Investment Capital Inf low Inflation Rate
Korea Turkey Korea Turkey Korea Turkey Korea Turkey
(as % of GNP)
1960 .8 13.7 10.9 16.1 8.6 0.5 10.7 5.3
1961 2.9 12.9 13.2 15.8 8.6 0.4 13.2 2.9
1962 3.3 11.6 12.8 15.3 10.7 2.0 9.4 5.7
1963 8.7 11.1 18.1 15.4 10.4 1.6 20.6 4.2
1964 8.7 13.6 14.0 15.3 6.9 1.6 34.6 4.4
1965 7.4 13.4 15.0 14.9 6.4 1.3 10.0 8.9
1966 11.8 15.8 21.6 17.6 8.4 1.1 8.9 4.4
1967 11.4 16.5 21.9 17.3 8.8 1.0 6.4 5.1
1968 15.1 16.0 25.9 18.0 11.2 1.4 8.1 3.4
1969 18.8 15.9 28.8 17.5 10.6 1.8 6.8 6.0
1970 17.3 16.8 26.8 19.5 9.3 2.3 9.2 5.6
1971 15.4 13.6 25.2 17.3 10.7 2.1 8.6 17.0
1972 15.7 16.4 21.7 20.1 5.2 4.3 13.8 18.4
1973 23.5 15.7 25.6 18.1 3.8 -1.1 6.9 19.8
1974 20.5 14.4 31.0 20.7 12.4 0.6 42.1 29.7
1975 18.6 14.3 29.4 22.5 10.4 3.7 26.6 11.0
1976 23.1 17.7 25.5 24.7 2.4 6.3 12.1 16.0
1977 25.1 16.9 27.3 25.0 0.6 7.0 9.0 23.5
1978 26.4 14.6 31.1 18.5 3.3 4.0 11.6 50.1
1979 26.6 14.2 35.4 18.3 7.6 0.9 18.8 64.8
1980 19.9 13.5 31.5 21.4 10.2 3.5 38.9 107.8
1981 19.6 15.8 28.4 21.5 7.9 2.0 20.4 37.5
1982 21.5 16.9 26.2 20.3 4.8 2.2 4.7 25.8
1983 26.9 16.4 27.8 20.7 3.1 2.7 .2 30.4
1984 30.1 11.0 30.0 20.1 3.5 2.4 .7 51.6
SOURCEs: Korean savings, investment and capital inflow: Kim Kwang Suk and Park Joon—
Kyung, Table 2—7.
Korean and Turkish prices: International Monetary Fund, InternationalFinancial Statistics Yearbook, 1985, pp.100—1
Turkey Gross Domestic Investment and Savings: State Planning
Organization, Turkey; Capital Inf low: International Monetary Fund,
International. Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1985, pp. 628—629.
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NOTES
See Lewis (1968) for a history.
2 It is doubtful if the conversion of land from forests and grazing land to
wheat was economic in the long run. See Hirsch and Hirsch, 1963.
Frank, Kim, and Westphal, 1975, P. 9.
It is unclear how military expenditures and military imports enter into
the national income accounts in either country. Korea has continued,
throughout the period of rapid development, to devote sizeable resources
to military expenditures. However, Turkey as a member of NATO has al-so
had a large military budget and received miLitary aid. It seems likely
that the drain of resources into milItary expenditures in the two
countries was fairly comparable, and that this constitutes a simiLarity,
rather than a difference, between them.
• Data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
Supplement to 1966/67 issues, Korea page.
6 This result was not unintended. The object of the Rhee Government had
been to maximize aid inflows, and."balance of payments needs" were used as
a lever in aid negotiations. See Cole and Lyman, 1971.
Despite the measures, a sizeable black market developed and trade
statistics of that period undoubtedly understate the actual value of
trade.
8 Once the export drive was under way, exporters were permitted to import
any item used in production for export duty—free. The percentage of
imports subject to any quantitative restriction fell sharply in the early
1960s, but in 1967 still stood at 39.6 percent, although these
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restrictions did not apply to exporters. The ratio fell gradually
thereafter, reaching 15.2 percent by 1984. See Nam, 1985, Table 3.
Source: Wontack Hong, "Export Promotion and Employment Growth in South
Korea," Table 8.6, in Krueger, Lary, et al. All PPP PLD EER estimates are
in constant 1965 won prices.
10
All estimates of income distribution are fraught with difficulty. For
1973, it is estimated that the bottom 20 percent of the Turkish income
distribution received 3.5 percent of all income, while the top 20 percent
received 56.5 percent. For Korea, the corresponding 1976 estimates are
5.7 percent and 45.3 percent. See World Bank, World Development Report,
1985, Table 28.
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